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1115 
LOCKED GLOVE COMPARTMENTS: SEARCHABLE OR 
STASH SPOTS? 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
People v. McFarlane1 
(decided March 13, 2012) 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
It is imperative that law enforcement officers are cognizant of 
and act within the bounds of their authority when stopping a vehicle 
as a result of a minor traffic violation.  Courts at both the federal and 
state levels are inundated with constitutional challenges related to 
searches and seizures occurring subsequent to lawful traffic stops.  
Although such a stop is generally lawful at its inception, issues arise 
regarding the officer’s conduct and the procedures employed thereaf-
ter.  Specifically, where an officer uncovers contraband or other evi-
dence of a crime, providing cause for arrest and criminal charges, the 
defense will challenge whether and to what extent the officer was au-
thorized to search.  The defense makes these challenges in an effort 
to persuade the court to suppress evidence supporting the charges, re-
ducing the likelihood of a criminal conviction. 
However, where the circumstances are suspect or the officer 
has knowledge that a crime has been or is about to occur, the prose-
cution may effectively argue that the warrantless search was permis-
sible.  The United States Supreme Court and New York State courts 
alike, observe several legal justifications, which when applicable, 
will excuse the Fourth Amendment requirement that a search be exe-
cuted with a warrant and supported by probable cause.  While courts 
have adopted exceptions to the Warrant Clause in light of the needs 
of an ever-changing society, one exception with deep historical roots 
is consent to search.2  However, a warrantless search executed with 
 
1 939 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012). 
2 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (seeking to resolve the 
1
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consent requires a showing that consent was voluntary and 
“[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the 
circumstances.”3  Voluntariness was not problematic in People v. 
McFarlane,4 rather the scope of the consent provided was at issue. 
The court in McFarlane sought to resolve whether defend-
ant’s consent gave the officer permission to search a locked glove 
compartment in a motor vehicle.5  The court made two inquiries be-
fore making its ruling—first analyzing the scope of defendant’s gen-
eral consent, and next assessing whether the officer’s entry into the 
vehicle for the purpose of opening the locked glove compartment 
made the search overly intrusive and beyond the scope of the con-
sent.6 
The contents discovered in the search resulted in defendant’s 
arrest and arraignment.7  At trial, defense counsel moved to suppress 
the loaded handgun the officer retrieved from the locked glove com-
partment.8  Upon “finding that defendant did not consent to a search 
of the car’s locked glove compartment,” the lower court granted the 
motion.9  Despite noting that the officer lawfully requested to search 
and defendant voluntarily consented, the court found that defendant 
only consented to a limited search, which did not include consent to 
open and search the locked glove compartment.10  The court stated 
that neither the officer’s statements, nor actions were sufficient to 
give a reasonable person in defendant’s position reason to believe the 
officer was seeking permission to open the locked glove compart-
ment.11  Thus, notwithstanding the discovery of illegal contraband, 
the court upheld defendant’s privacy rights in the contents of the 
 
“square conflict of views between the state and federal courts” with regard to the prosecu-
tion’s burden “to demonstrate that a consent was ‘voluntarily’ given.”).  In Schneckloth, the 
Court held that “when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justi-
fy a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it 
demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or co-
ercion, express or implied.”  Id. at 248. 
3 Id. at 248-49 (noting that “while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor 
to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a 
prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.”). 
4 939 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012). 
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glove compartment, creating a safe haven for drivers to conceal 
weapons and/or other contraband in locked compartments. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In the course of a lawful traffic stop, a police officer observed 
troubling items in plain view within defendant’s vehicle.12  These 
items included “a large wad of rolled up cash, a partly empty liquor 
bottle, and crushed up papers.”13  The officer inquired with defendant 
about these observations, and in turn, defendant’s brief and blunt an-
swers raised further suspicion.14  In light of the circumstances, the of-
ficer perceived illegal activity was afoot and the possible presence of 
contraband.15  The officer then “asked defendant if there was any-
thing in the vehicle that he should know about.”16 After defendant re-
plied that there was not, the officer sought permission to “take a 
look” inside the vehicle to confirm whether his suspicions were war-
ranted.17  Defendant replied, “[g]o ahead.”18  The officer checked 
around the “seats and center console,” and then, without objection, 
removed the keys from the ignition to unlock and open the glove 
compartment.19  Inside the glove compartment, the officer discovered 
a loaded gun.20 
At trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the gun, arguing 
that the scope of the search was overly invasive and violated defend-
ant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.21  Arguably, however, based 
on the officer observing items in plain view prior to requesting and 
receiving consent to search, a reasonable person should have realized 
the officer intended to inspect areas and enclosures that were not 
within his viewpoint from outside the vehicle.22 
The court began by explaining that the People bear the burden 









19 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 462 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
3
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precedent to finding valid consent.23  However, defense counsel did 
not argue that consent was involuntary, but argued the search exceed-
ed the scope of the consent.24  Turning to the legal standard “for 
measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth 
Amendment,” the court noted that it was one “of objective reasona-
bleness.”25  A court decides whether the search was executed con-
sistent with or in violation of constitutional mandates by inquiring as 
to what “the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by 
the exchange between the officer and the suspect.”26 
In applying an objective standard, the court relied upon Flori-
da v. Jimeno.27  In Jimeno, the respondent challenged that an officer 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights in the context of a vehicular 
search.28  The facts in Jimeno resembled those in McFarlane.29  After 
Officer Trujillo “observed respondent make a right turn at a red light 
without stopping,” he pulled the respondent over “to issue him a traf-
fic citation.”30  Based upon earlier observations, specifically, Officer 
Trujillo “overheard respondent . . . arranging what appeared to be a 
drug transaction over a public telephone,” he told the respondent that 
he suspected there were narcotics in his vehicle and requested his 
consent to search.31  The respondent “stated that he had nothing to 
hide and gave [Officer] Trujillo permission to search the automo-
bile.”32  In his search, Officer Trujillo found a “folded, brown paper 
bag on the floorboard . . . [and] a kilogram of cocaine inside.”33 
Upon defense counsel’s motion, the trial court suppressed the 
 
23 Id. at 461 (majority opinion) (citing People v. Whitehurst, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906 (1969)). 
24 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (observing that the court’s analysis primarily focused 
on the scope of the search that defendant, acting as a reasonable person under the circum-
stances, would have believed he consented to, specifically, what areas within the vehicle, it 
was reasonable to believe that his consent gave the officer permission to search). 
25 Id. at 461 (citing Florida v. Jimeno 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). 
28 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249. 
29 Compare McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (noting that defendant consented to the of-
ficer’s search of his vehicle, but defense counsel argued that the locked glove compartment 
was not within the consent given), with Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-50 (noting that the defend-
ant likewise gave the officer permission to search his vehicle, but defense counsel posited 
that closed containers in the car were beyond the scope of the consent). 
30 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 249-50. 
33 Id. at 250. 
4
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cocaine “on the ground that [respondent’s] consent to search the car 
did not extend to the closed paper bag inside the car.”34  The decision 
was affirmed on appeal.35  Yet, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to resolve the question of whether “closed containers found inside the 
vehicle” fall within the scope of a consensual vehicular search.36  An-
swering this question in the affirmative, the Court overturned the trial 
court’s ruling, reiterating two important principles in its opinion.37 
First, observing “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
is reasonableness,”38 the Court stated that “it is no doubt reasonable 
for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to 
do so.”39  Second, the Court stated that “[t]he scope of a search is 
generally defined by its expressed object.”40  In other words, as-
sessing the scope of consent requires scrutiny of the officer, the sus-
pect’s language, and the overall exchange.41  Since neither the officer 
nor suspect “place[d] any explicit limitation on the scope of the 
search,” the Court found that upon receiving general consent to 
search, the police had authority to search objects or compartments 
within the vehicle, especially those likely to hold contraband.42  The 
Court pointed to the officer’s statement, “that he believed respondent 
was carrying narcotics” as putting a reasonable person on notice that 
his general consent would “include[] consent to search containers 
within that car which might bear drugs.”43  Further, “a reasonable 
person [is] expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in 
some form of container”44 and not “strewn across the trunk or floor of 
a car.”45 
Considering the similar facts presented, had the court in 
McFarlane carefully looked at the legal principles in Jimeno, perhaps 
the majority of justices in McFarlane would have arrived at a differ-
 
34 Id. 
35 State v. Jimeno, 550 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d, 564 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 
1990), rev'd, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
36 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)). 
39 Id. at 250-51 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219). 
40 Id. at 251 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982)). 
41 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. 
42 Id. (explaining that “[t]he authorization to search in this case . . . extended beyond the 
surfaces of the car’s interior to the paper bag lying on the car’s floor.”). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 820). 
5
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ent conclusion.  But rather, the court in McFarlane simply referenced 
the decision, adopted the objective standard and narrowly interpreted 
the holding.  Emphasizing that the Court in Jimeno ruled upon the 
reasonableness of searching closed containers, as opposed to the 
search of a locked glove compartment, the court in McFarlane con-
cluded that the officer’s request to “take a look” or “check” the ve-
hicular for contraband would not cause a reasonable person in de-
fendant’s position to believe he consented to a search of the glove 
compartment.46  Rather, noting that “a locked container can only be 
opened by breaking into it or using a key,” the court held that the 
locked glove compartment was beyond the scope of defendant’s con-
sent.47  However, the court failed to consider the totality of circum-
stances of the officer and defendant’s exchange, particularly, the of-
ficer’s plain view observations that caused him to suspect there was 
contraband in the vehicle and defendant giving general consent with-
out limiting the scope of his consent.48  While a closed paper bag and 
locked glove compartment are different, the court in McFarlane ig-
nored that both enclosures are capable of and may be used to conceal 
contraband.49 
The court in McFarlane proposed that additional specific con-
sent is needed for police to search a locked glove compartment.50  
The court stated that if the officer “asked [defendant] for the key or 
asked defendant to open [the glove compartment] himself, then a rea-
sonable person may have perceived consent to search to include the 
 
46 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461.  The court stated that objectively, a reasonable person 
in defendant’s position would perceive the officer’s words as “a request to search the vehi-
cle, possibly to include closed containers, but it did not reasonably imply a request for per-
mission to open the locked glove compartment.”  Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See, e.g., Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (noting that absent “any explicit limitation on the 
scope of the search” and in light of the officer’s expressed suspicions of narcotics being pre-
sent in the vehicle, “it was objectively reasonably for the police to conclude that the general 
consent to search respondent’s car included consent to search containers within that care 
which might bear drugs.”). 
49 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (observing that the Court in Jimeno relied on the fact 
that contraband is commonly concealed and not readily exposed in order to justify the of-
ficer’s actions in opening the container found within the vehicle). 
50 Compare id. (requiring additional specific consent to search to justify the warrantless 
vehicular search), with Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 (observing that the Court wholly rejected the 
argument that additional, specific consent was required, concluding that there was “no basis 
[to] add[] this sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amendment’s basic test of objective rea-
sonableness”). 
6
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glove compartment.51  The only authority raised in support of this 
proposition was People v. Gomez,52 in which the Court of Appeals 
held “it was unreasonable for the police officer to interpret defend-
ant’s general consent to search as consent to use a crowbar to damage 
the gas tank.”53  Yet, as posited by the Honorable Justice Saxe, dis-
senting in McFarlane, the majority’s reliance on Gomez was mis-
placed, as unlocking the glove compartment caused absolutely no 
damage to the structural integrity of the vehicle.54 
Justice Saxe objectively assessed the scope of defendant’s 
general consent and observed that entering the vehicle, removing 
keys from the ignition, and unlocking the glove compartment was 
minimally intrusive.55  Justice Saxe found defendant’s consent, with-
out verbal or implied limitations, made it reasonable to give the of-
ficer authority to search the glove compartment.56  Further, Justice 
Saxe critiqued the majority for ignoring “the motion court’s reason-
ing” in which it “concede[d] that the officer’s request to ‘take a look’ 
into the car or ‘check’ it for contraband would have been reasonably 
understood to be a request to search the vehicle, including visible but 
closed containers.”57 
Justice Saxe proposed that defendant’s general consent au-
thorized the officer to search the interior of the vehicle, including its 
enclosures and compartments.58  He found the officer’s actions justi-
fied under the circumstances, as defendant could have, but made no 
objection to the officer reaching across him, removing keys, and 
opening the glove compartment.59  Justice Saxe aligned the facts in 
McFarlane with those in People v. Mitchell,60 analyzing the scope of 
general consent, and People v. Mota,61 explaining the relevance of 
observations made prior to seeking consent to search, and further, re-
 
51 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (noting that the officer in McFarlane “simply took the 
keys from the ignition and opened the glove compartment” without specifically requesting 
defendant’s permission). 
52 838 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 2005). 
53 Id. at 1274. 
54 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461-63 (Saxe, J., dissenting). 




59 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 462. 
60 621 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995). 
61 No. 4698-01, 2003 WL 175306, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 2003). 
7
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jected the majority’s reliance on Gomez as unpersuasive.62 
In People v. Mitchell, a police officer lawfully stopped de-
fendant because he was driving a vehicle with tinted windows.63  
Thereafter, the officer asked defendant whether “he could ‘look 
through’ the car.”64  The court found defendant’s response, “you can 
look through anything you want,” was valid consent to search.65  This 
conclusion was based on three observations.  First, in consenting to a 
search, defendant “placed no limitation whatsoever on the search of 
the automobile.”66  Likewise, defendant voiced no “objection while 
the arresting officer searched the back seat.”67  Moreover, the court 
explained, “the phrase to ‘look through’ the automobile can only be 
reasonably understood to request more than permission to conduct a 
visual inspection; it was clearly a request to search the car.”68 
Thus, Justice Saxe criticized the majority for distinguishing 
between the answers given by each of the respective defendants in 
McFarlane and in Mitchell.69  Further, Justice Saxe noted that the 
scope of consent should not be based exclusively on the verbal ex-
change between a defendant and the police, but the totality of circum-
stances.70  Justice Saxe argued, a reasonable person in defendant’s 
position would perceive the officer’s request to “look through” or 
“check” the car “as a viable request to search” areas not already visi-
ble, and defendant’s “affirmative answer to that request would consti-
tute a consent to [such] search.”71 
 
62 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63. 
63 Mitchell, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 582. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  McFarlane placed no limitation on his consent and, without a limit, the police of-
ficer conducted a search that he had routinely conducted in similar situations which, as evi-
denced by his testimony always included the glove compartment.  McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d 
at 462-63. 
67 Mitchell, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 582.  Nothing in the McFarlane opinion suggests the defend-
ant was not still in the vehicle at the time of the search of the glove compartment.  McFar-
lane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63.  There is also nothing in the record suggesting the defendant 
was not present to witness the officer’s actions.  Id.  The defendant could have objected to 
the officer’s actions at any time and instead chose to remain silent and voice no objection.  
Id. 
68 Mitchell, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 582. 
69 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (noting that the Mitchell case was heard in the same 
court as McFarlane in 1995). 
70 Id. at 462-63. 
71 Id. at 462. 
8
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Moreover, relying on People v. Mota,72 Justice Saxe demon-
strated that implicit in a request to search is the reasonable under-
standing that the officer seeks to “inspect areas beyond that which 
could already been seen.”73  In Mota, police lawfully stopped defend-
ant’s car after observing excessively tinted windows, which violated 
Vehicle and Traffic Law, section 375(12-a)(b).74  Upon request, de-
fendant agreed to allow the officers to “look in the car.”75  Defendant 
admitted he understood the dialogue between himself and the officers 
was a request to search and that his answer was consent to search.76  
The police noticed “defects” in the airbag and “conclude[d] that the 
compartment had been modified.”77  The glove compartment, due to 
the modified airbag, was the focus of the search.78  After observing 
“foam padding that [the police] knew did not belong there,” one of-
ficer “took his knife and carefully pried open the air bag cover.”79  
Using his flashlight to illuminate the contents located within the gap 
he had created, the officer discovered a handgun and ammunition.80  
The court held that “the search of the glove compartment and the air 
bag compartment were within the scope of the consent given.”81  The 
court explained that the existence of a hidden or altered compartment 
in a vehicle is a strong indication of criminal activity, and thus, such 
observation gave the police further legal justification, beyond that 
 
72 No. 4698/01, 2003 WL 175306, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 2003). 
73 Id. at *5 (“Any reasonable person would have understood that with the interior of the 
car already illuminated and plainly visible, a count to ‘look in’ meant a ‘[consensual] search’ 
of the vehicle’s areas which were not already exposed to view.”). 
74 Id. at *3; see generally N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 5375 (McKinney 2012). 
75 Mota, 2003 WL 175306, at *3. 
76 Id. at *4 (noting the presence of a language barrier because the driver spoke Spanish). 
77 Id.  at *2.  The officer testified that while still outside the vehicle and prior to any ques-
tioning, he noticed the air bag had a crevice and was unusually clean, and based on his train-
ing he knew this required the air bag’s cover removal at some point prior to this stop.  Id. 
78 Id. at *2-*3 (noting that similar to a glove compartment, an airbag is a fixed, standard 
component to be found in all automobiles, and further, an airbag is protected by a casing 
which viewed broadly could be considered a lock).  The search in Mota was similar to that 
which occurred in McFarlane, and neither a lock, nor a piece of plastic should make these 
types of compartments off limits to searches by police officers who have suspicion of illegal 
activity related to plain sight observances.  Compare McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63 
(observing, as noted in the dissent, that the officer’s search did not impair the integrity of the 
vehicle), with Mota, 2003 WL 175306, at *2-*3 (observing that the officer altered the airbag 
compartment in the course of his search and his action in prying open the area in order to 
discover the contraband was overly intrusive). 
79 Mota, 2003 WL 175306, at *2. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at *5. 
9
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which was initially provided by consent, to carry out the search.82 
Relying on the rationale in Mota, Justice Saxe noted that the 
officer in McFarlane only requested consent to search the vehicle af-
ter he had observed “the large wad of rolled-up cash . . . and the liq-
uor bottle and cups.”83  Thus, because of initial observations made 
before the officer requested permission to search, Justice Saxe argued 
that “[u]nder these circumstances, defendant could only understand 
the request to ‘take a look’ as a request to search for contraband in-
side closed containers in the car and places the police had not already 
been able to see.”84 
Further, Justice Saxe noted the officer’s testimony at trial, 
stating that searching “under the seats, inside the [center] console, 
[and] the glove compartment” was his standard protocol when con-
ducting a vehicular search.85  This procedure supported Justice Saxe’s 
position that the officer’s conduct in carrying out the search pursuant 
to defendant’s consent was objectively reasonable.86  In fact, Judge 
Saxe posited that “a search of the interior of the car would have been 
incomplete without a search of the glove compartment.”87 
Finally, Justice Saxe addressed the issue of “whether the fact 
that the glove compartment was locked, would as a matter of law, al-
ter the normal expectation [of privacy] that a consent to search the in-
terior of a car would include the glove compartment.”88  Justice Saxe 
concluded that “merely encountering a lock [did not] negate the con-
sent, requiring the police to seek additional permission before pro-
ceeding further with their search.”89  In support of this conclusion, 
Justice Saxe considered the facts presented and disposition of the 
 
82 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (noting that the court used a totality of the circum-
stances approach, finding that the consent the police obtained had encompassed the search of 
the altered airbag compartment and the glove compartment). 
83 Mota, 2003 WL 175306, at *6-*7. 
84 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 462.  The police always have the ability to see what is in 
plain sight, whether it is during the day using natural light, or at night with flashlights.  
Mota, 2003 WL 175306, at *5.  Thus, it logically follows that after being questioned about 
what an officer observed was already in plain sight, granting permission to search in these 
circumstances is a grant of specific consent to search that which is not visible in plain sight.  
McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 463 (drawing this inference in light of the officer’s testimony as to what is typi-
cally searched after being given consent to search a vehicle). 
87 Id. at 462-63. 
88 Id. at 463. 
89  McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 463. 
10
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case in Gomez.90 
In Gomez, the police stopped defendant because of excessive-
ly tinted windows.91  One officer noticed a fresh coat of paint on the 
gas tank.92  Upon obtaining consent to search, the officer “went to the 
rear seat, unlocked it and pulled it back . . . observed ‘non-factory’ 
carpet . . . pulled up the glued carpeting and discovered a cut in the 
floorboard.”93  “After struggling . . . [the officer] returned to his 
cruiser and retrieved a crowbar, which he used to pry open part of the 
gas tank,” and then found “cocaine weighing approximately 1 ½  
pounds.”94  The search was later challenged in court.95  The court in 
Gomez held that general consent alone “cannot justify a search that 
impairs the structural integrity of a vehicle or that results in the vehi-
cle being returned in a materially different manner than it was 
found.”96  Thus, because the ruling seemed to limit the scope of gen-
eral consent, the majority in McFarlane relied on Gomez to support 
its conclusion that the search was overly intrusive and beyond the 
scope of the consented to search.97 
However, as Justice Saxe observed, the majority’s reliance on 
Gomez was misplaced.98  The facts in Gomez were entirely distin-
guishable from those presented in McFarlane.99  The court in Gomez 
merely found that defendant’s general consent to search did not au-
thorize police to use a crowbar and impair the integrity of a vehi-
cle,100 as such extreme conduct would rarely pass constitutional mus-
ter in terms of its reasonableness.  Justice Saxe emphasized that the 
officer in McFarlane was not forceful and did no damage to the vehi-
cle.101  Therefore, Justice Saxe concluded, after defendant consented 
to allow the officer to conduct a search, “there [was] nothing unrea-
 
90 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d 1271. 
91 Id. at 1272. 
92 Id. (noting that this observation put the police on notice that the gas tank could have 
been altered for the purpose of storing contraband). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272. 
96 Id. at 1273. 
97 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461. 
98 Id. at 463 (Saxe, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court in Gomez “merely held, unre-
markably, that the defendant’s general consent to search his car did not authorize the police 
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sonable . . . upon finding the glove compartment locked, reaching 
over to the key in the ignition, removing it and using it to unlock the 
glove compartment.”102 
Moreover, Justice Saxe acknowledged the logical reasoning 
behind Justice Read’s dissent in Gomez, noting that defendant was 
aware the police were looking for narcotics, and thus, the officers 
were seeking consent to search compartments where narcotics are 
generally stored.103  Given the increased sophistication of drug deal-
ers and smugglers in a modern society and their innovative ideas and 
“efforts to hide contraband,” Justice Read expressed that it is reason-
able for the police to construe consent to search as inclusive of con-
sent to search hidden compartments now created in vehicles.104 
This case note presents an analysis of both state and federal 
law, consistent with Justice Saxe’s dissenting opinion, suggesting that 
glove compartments should fall within the scope of a consensual 
search.  It posits that the mere presence of a lock should not create a 
barrier, making the enclosure behind the lock off limits.  Rather, the 
police should be given some leeway to open locks, especially by key, 
as in McFarlane, which was minimally intrusive and reasonable un-
der the circumstances.  Historically, courts have struggled to balance 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights and governmental interests.  While 
interpreted with minor variance at the state and federal level, the 
search and seizure clauses of the United States Constitution and that 
of the New York State Constitution operate with a caveat—each pro-
hibits and protects the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
Moreover, the expectation of privacy maintained in an auto-
mobile is not the same as that received in an immobile place, specifi-
cally in a place of residence.
105
  Rather, in light of the risk that unde-
 
102 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 463.  In fact, Judge Saxe remarked that such “action is 
exactly what is reasonably to be expected” under that set of circumstances.  Id. 
103 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1274-78 (Read, J., dissenting). 
104 Id.  Justice Read dissented in Gomez, suggesting that the officers should be able to 
search hidden compartments.  Id. (noting that the legal justifications set forth in the dissent-
ing opinion were consistent with those raised by Justice Saxe in McFarlane, especially con-
sidering that a glove compartment is not even a hidden compartment, but one readily in plain 
view as part of the interior of a vehicle). 
105 Compare Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (“One has a lesser expectation 
of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as 
one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects.  A car has little capacity for escaping 
public scrutiny.  It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are 
in plain view.”), with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (“In the home, our cases show, 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 4, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/10
2013] LOCKED GLOVE COMPARTMENTS 1127 
tected criminal activity on the roads presents to the public at large, in 
addition to the flight risk in the course of an investigation, drivers 
have a reduced expectation of privacy in the context of a vehicular 
search.
106
  Also, due to their mobility, it is not practical for the police 
to stop a car, get a warrant application to a magistrate, and await its 
approval to search.
107
  Thus, exceptions to the Warrant Clause, such 
as consent to search, play a role in deciding upon the reasonableness 
of a warrantless search.
108
 
When a police officer requests permission to search, most 
courts will construe affirmative answers such as: “yes,” “go ahead,” 
or “sure,” to constitute consent.
109
  However, when consenting to a 
search, suspects have a right to expressly limit the search.
110
  Nota-
bly, in McFarlane, defendant placed no such limitations, neither ob-
jected to, nor attempted to stop the officer from removing the keys 
from the ignition and unlocking the glove compartment.  The majori-
ty in McFarlane proposed that specific consent is needed to open a 
locked compartment.  In doing so, the court’s ruling was pro-
defendant, as the balance tipped in favor of defendant’s privacy, 
which outweighed the government’s interest in detecting and prevent-
ing crime.  
The ramifications of the holding in McFarlane cannot be ig-
nored—as the court created the illusion that a locked glove compart-
ment is a vehicular safe house in which criminals can safely carry and 
conceal their contraband. 
 
all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government 
eyes.”) (emphasis in original). 
106 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (noting that “less rigorous 
warrant requirements govern [vehicular searches] because the expectation of privacy with 
respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.”). 
107 Id. (observing that “automobiles create[] circumstances of such exigency that, as a 
practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.”). 
108 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (“The question of whether . . . 
consent . . . was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or 
implied, is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances,”). 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (“Police officers act in 
full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent.  It reinforces the rule of law for 
the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on 
that understanding.  When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion.”). 
110 See, e.g., Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249 (observing that the Court found the respondent’s 
general consent to include closed containers capable of concealing the object of the search, 
emphasizing the fact that the respondent gave the officer “permission to search his car, and 
did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search”). 
13
Levtow: Locked Glove Compartments
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1128 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
III.  THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
The Fourth Amendment protects the American people from 
being subject to “unreasonable search and seizures.”111  Thus, the 
United States Supreme Court created the “exclusionary rule, [as] a 
deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evi-
dence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.”112  Never-
theless, due to circumstances in which a warrantless search may be 
reasonable, the judiciary has carved out narrow exceptions, which au-
thorize the police to search areas and seize items notwithstanding the 
constitutional constraints.113  These exceptions promote efficiency in 
the judicial process and protect citizens against the risk inherent in 
allowing contraband to go undetected on the streets.114  However, 
even these “exception[s] to the warrant requirement, requir[e] [strict] 
adherence to [and scrutiny of what falls within] a reasonableness 
standard.”115  In reviewing the officer’s conduct and search tactics 
used in a Fourth Amendment challenge, as a general rule, courts rec-
ognize that “the specific content and incidents of this right [to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure] must be shaped by the context 
in which it is asserted.”116  Also, as explored below, courts might ex-
cuse the intrusive nature of a warrantless search when it is made with 
 
111 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011).  Article I, section 12 of the 
New York Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.  The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the person or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
112 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423. 
113 Id. 
114 See Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1275-76 (noting that the dissent observed the heightened 
sophistication of the methods used to hide contraband); see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (ex-
tending the authorization to search beyond the surfaces of the cars interior to objects found 
within the car). 
115 United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1981) (providing an in-depth 
discussion of the enactment and application of the exclusionary rule and each of the judicial-
ly-crafted exceptions that allow for the admissibility of unlawfully seized evidence). 
116 Terry v. United States, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
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voluntary consent.117 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to establish a bright 
line rule as to what is permissible when a warrantless vehicular 
search is performed with consent.  Rather, when the scope of the 
search is at issue, the Supreme Court objectively assesses what is in-
cluded in the consent based on what a reasonable person would un-
derstand from the exchange between the officer and the accused.118  
More recently, in an effort to combat the sophistication of modern 
day drug smugglers and dealers in concealing, transacting, and using 
contraband, the Court has given “police officers who have legitimate-
ly stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe 
that contraband is concealed somewhere within it” greater leeway to 
perform searches equivalent to a search executed with a valid war-
rant.119 
In performing a vehicular search, the police encounter a varie-
ty of items and enclosures within the vehicle, including those in plain 
view whether easily accessible, hidden, locked away, and/or con-
cealed.  Items discovered might include clothing with pockets, suit-
cases, or other types of bags, wherein officers might find personal ef-
fects or criminal evidence.  Officers also open compartments, which 
include, but are not limited to center consoles, glove compartments, 
enclosures built upon a dashboard, and inside of the trunk. 
Based upon the specific item or area and its location in the 
vehicle, the police must make instantaneous judgments as to the 
scope of search that is reasonable under the circumstances.120  Courts 
 
117 See generally Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (noting that when consent is voluntarily 
given and the consenter had the authority to consent, courts may uphold the constitutionality 
of both the search and the fruits retrieved as a result).  The author explores the importance of 
consensual searches as well as general reliability of evidence seized in this context.  Id. 
118 See, e.g., Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), abrogated by Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419; Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), abrogated by Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419. 
119 Ross, 456 U.S. at 800.  For a full discussion of the similarities between searches con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant and searches made when an officer acts upon probable cause, 
see generally Ross, 456 U.S. at 798-99 (recognizing that a warrant is procured based upon an 
application supporting and a magistrate’s finding of probable cause and a warrantless search 
is lawful if the officer possessed probable cause and exigent circumstances justified immedi-
ate action). 
120 For a demonstration of how the United States Supreme Court assesses the constitution-
ality and scope of a lawful search and seizure see generally Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (conclud-
ing that the search of a brown paper bag found on the floor of the vehicle was within the 
scope of the consensual search), Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (finding the search of the trunk as 
well as a brown package contained therein was reasonable under the circumstances), and Ar-
izona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (upholding the constitutionality of the search of jacket 
15
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sometimes analyze the suspect’s location at the time of the search to 
decide if the search was overly intrusive.121  While the court in 
McFarlane did not consider defendant’s proximity to the glove com-
partment in its determination,122 whether a suspect is inside the car 
during a search, or alternatively, outside the car and already under ar-
rest, lends itself to the reasonableness of the search conducted.  The 
federal precedent governing automobile searches is explored below, 
considering (i) the scope of consensual vehicular searches, (ii) the 
scope of searches pursuant to the automobile exception, and (iii) the 
scope of searches incident to a lawful arrest. 
A.  Searches Incident to Arrest 
In Chimel v. California,123 the petitioner challenged his con-
viction on the ground that the evidence presented against him in court 
was unlawfully seized.124  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the seizure was improper as a result of an unrea-
sonable search, and sought to clarify the scope of a search incident to 
a lawful arrest.125  The petitioner’s initial encounter with police was 
proper, as the police arrived at the petitioner’s home with an arrest 
warrant related to the petitioner’s alleged involvement in a burgla-
ry.126  After presenting the arrest warrant, police asked for consent to 
“look around” because “[n]o search warrant had been issued.”127  De-
spite the petitioner objecting, the police conducted a search anyway, 
acting “on the basis of the lawful arrest.”128 
First noting that “ ‘the recurring questions of the reasonable-
ness of searches’ depend upon ‘the facts and circumstances-the total 
atmosphere of the case,’ ” the Court explained, “those facts and cir-
cumstances [still] must be viewed in light of established Fourth 
 
found within the car). 
121 See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620 (2004) (explaining that “the 
scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest as [authorizing a search of] the person of the ar-
restee and the area immediately surrounding him” so as to “remove any weapon the arrestee 
might seek to use” and “prevent [the arrestee from engaging in conduct that might result in] 
the concealment or destruction of evidence”). 
122 See generally McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d 460.  
123 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated by Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419. 
124 Id. at 753. 
125 Id. at 755. 
126 Id. at 753. 
127 Id. at 753-54. 
128 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753-54. 
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Amendment principles.”129  In turn, since the home is a place deserv-
ing of the most protection, and due to the intrusive nature of the 
search—the police entered every room, moved furniture, searched for 
one hour, and seized just about any item they believed might “have 
come from the burglary,”130 the search was found “ ‘unreasonable’ 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”131  Recognizing 
“[t]he search here went far beyond the petitioner’s person and the ar-
ea from within which he might have obtained a weapon or something 
that could have been used as evidence against him,” the Court con-
cluded that the police were not justified “in the absence of a search 
warrant, for extending the search beyond that area.”132 
However, whether a search is reasonable under the circum-
stances varies by the context in which it occurs, as individuals have 
less protected privacy when operating or occupying an automobile 
than that maintained within a place of residence.133  In New York v. 
Belton,134 the court found, as an incident to a lawful arrest, the officer 
was authorized in seizing contraband from the pocket of a jacket re-
trieved from the glove compartment because it was within the “ar-
restees immediate control.”135 
In Belton, the officer stopped a vehicle “traveling at an exces-
sive rate of speed” and upon approaching the vehicle, “smelled burnt 
marihuana” and observed “an envelope marked ‘Supergold’ that he 
associated with marihuana.”136  The officer then ordered the occu-
pants out of the vehicle and placed each under arrest “for the unlaw-
ful possession of marihuana.”137  After the officer searched the occu-
pants, he next “searched the passenger compartment of the car,” from 
within he retrieved a jacket, searched its pockets, and found co-
caine.138  In its analysis, the Court observed, “ ‘the exigencies of the 
situation’ may sometimes make exemption from the warrant require-
 
129 Id. at 765 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63, 66 (1950), overruled 
in part by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752). 
130 Id. at 754. 
131 Id. at 768. 
132 Id. 
133 See generally Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (observing the scope of a search of an automobile 
made incident to arrest). 
134 453 U.S. 454 (1981), abrogated by Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419. 
135 Id. at 462-63 (noting that the Court found the search of a glove compartment justified 
at the time of defendant’s arrest because it was within defendant’s reaching distance). 
136 Id. at 455-56. 
137 Id. at 456. 
138 Id. 
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ment ‘imperative.’ ”139  In this situation, an arresting officer is justi-
fied to conduct a “contemporaneous search without a warrant of the 
person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area.”140 
Expanding upon the precedent from Chimel, the Court estab-
lished that “the police may [] examine the contents of any containers 
found within the passenger compartment,” authorizing the search of 
these containers regardless of whether “open or closed.”141  The 
Court explained that a reasonable expectation of privacy in the con-
tainer may exist, but “the lawful custodial arrest justifies the in-
fringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.”142  There-
fore, construing the compartment as an area “within the arrestee’s 
immediate control”, the Court held that the search therein did not vio-
late the respondent’s constitutional rights.143 
The Supreme Court in Thornton v. United States144 addressed 
whether a suspect’s car can be searched incident to arrest if the arrest 
occurs after the occupant exited the vehicle.145  In Thornton, the peti-
tioner initially aroused the suspicions of an officer, who drove an 
unmarked car, after he “slowed down so as to avoid driving next to 
[the officer].”146  The officer then “ran a check on petitioner’s license 
tags, which revealed that the tags had been issued to a 1982 Chevy 
two-door and not to a Lincoln Town Car, the model of car the peti-
tioner was driving.”147  However, before the officer was able to stop 
the petitioner, the petitioner pulled into a parking lot where he parked 
and exited his vehicle.148  Upon approaching and questioning the peti-
tioner, the petitioner responded nervously, as he was sweating and 
 
139 Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 
(1948)). 
140 Id. (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 
141 Id. at 460-61. 
142 Compare id. at 461 (recognizing the arrestees’ privacy interests in the passenger com-
partment of a car, but finding legal justification for the infringement of that interest), with 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (upholding the arrestee’s privacy interest in the contents of the 
drawers in his home because none of the areas searched were within a reaching distance so 
as to present a danger to the police). 
143 Belton, 453 U.S. at 462-63. 
144 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
145 Id. at 617 (extending the scope of searches conducted incident to arrest by allowing 
police to conduct a search after the suspect has exited the vehicle where the suspect still pre-
sents a threat to the officer’s safety). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 618. 
148 Id. 
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“began rambling and licking his lips.”149 
Despite the petitioner advising the officer that he did not pos-
sess, either on his person or in his vehicle, “any narcotics or weap-
ons,” the officer was still “[c]oncerned for his safety,” which justified 
a subsequent consensual pat down.150  The officer “again asked [the 
petitioner] if he had any illegal narcotics on him” after discovering “a 
bulge in petitioner’s left front pocket.”151  At this point, the petitioner 
answered in the affirmative, admitting to possession of and voluntari-
ly revealing “three bags of marijuana and . . . a large amount of crack 
cocaine.”152  The officer arrested the petitioner, seized the drugs in 
his possession, and then “searched petitioner’s vehicle and found a 
BryCo 9-millimeter handgun under the driver’s seat.”153 
After charged by a grand jury, the petitioner challenged that 
“the firearm [w]as the fruit of an unconstitutional search,” requiring 
suppression.154  The district court denied the motion on two grounds, 
the automobile search was (i) valid under New York v. Belton, as 
made incident to arrest, and, (ii) also authorized as an inventory 
search.155  In the petitioner’s subsequent appeal, he urged the court to 
interpret Belton as “limited to situations where the officer initiated 
contact with an arrestee while he was still an occupant of the car.”156  
However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling,157 
emphasizing the fact that “petitioner [had] conceded that he was in 
‘close proximity, both temporally and spatially,’ to his vehicle” justi-
fied finding “the car [] within petitioner’s immediate control.”158 
The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that “the arrest of a 
suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding 
officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who 
is inside the vehicle.”159  The Court explained that especially in this 
context, there must be “a clear rule, readily understood by police of-
ficers and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or 
 





154 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618. 
155 Id. at 618-19. 
156 Id. at 619. 
157 United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2003). 
158 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 619 (quoting Thornton, 325 F.3d at 196). 
159 Id. at 621. 
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were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment.”160 
However, in Arizona v. Gant,161 the Supreme Court regressed 
on its decision to afford such broad latitude to the police.  In Gant, 
the defendant “was arrested for driving with a suspended license, 
handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car.”162  After placing 
the defendant out of harm’s way, the police searched the defendant’s 
automobile, at which time one officer “found a gun, and the other 
discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the 
backseat.”163  In turn, the defendant challenged the search conducted 
as beyond the scope of the search incident to arrest exception, as “he 
posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol 
car.”164  At the suppression hearing, the officers did not seek to justify 
the search based upon concerns as to their safety or the destruction of 
evidence, but rather, admitted their course of action was motivated by 
the mere fact it was permissible by the law.165  The Court wholly re-
jected this contention, finding the officers’ actions unreasonable un-
der the circumstances.166  The Court held that the police are author-
ized “to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only 
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment [or other area sought to be searched] at the 
time of the search.”167 
B.  The Automobile Exception 
In addition to the circumstances under which a search is con-
ducted, courts also consider the knowledge possessed by the officer, 
relating to alleged criminal activity, at the time the search was con-
ducted.  In California v. Acevedo,168 the Court analyzed the scope of 
a search made under the “automobile exception,” regarding “its ap-
plication to the search of a closed container in the trunk of a car.”169  
In Acevedo, drug enforcement agents arranged a scheme with which 
 
160 Id. at 623. 
161 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
162 Id. at 335. 
163 Id. at 336. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 336-37. 
166 Gant, 556 U.S. at 344. 
167 Id. 
168 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
169 Id. at 566. 
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the agents planned to “arrest the person who arrived to claim” a 
package containing marijuana from the Federal Express office.170  
The agents observed the suspect retrieve the package, carry it into an 
apartment, and thereafter,  “leave the apartment and drop the box . . . 
that had contained the marijuana into a trash bin.171  While one agent 
went to apply for a warrant, the others stayed at the scene and saw 
another suspect “leave the apartment carrying a blue knapsack which 
appeared to be half full.”172  The respondent was the next to arrive at 
the scene, entering the apartment and exiting within ten minutes “car-
rying a brown paper bag that looked full.”173  After observing the re-
spondent put the brown paper bag in the trunk of his car, the police 
stopped him, opened the trunk, found marijuana in the bag, and 
placed the respondent under arrest.174 
At trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the marihuana on 
the ground that the search was unconstitutional.175  Yet, the Court ob-
served that “the law applicable to [the search of] a closed container in 
an automobile [has been] a subject that has troubled courts and law 
enforcement officers.”176  The Court first looked to Carroll v. United 
States,177 holding that “a warrantless search of an automobile, based 
upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of 
crime in the light of an exigency arising out of the likely disappear-
ance of the vehicle, did not contravene the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment.”178  Next, the Court looked to United States v. 
Ross,179 in which it clarified that if there is probable cause, then it is 
lawful for the police to conduct “a ‘probing search’ of compartments 
and container within the automobile” as permissible under the auto-
mobile exception previously upheld in Carroll.180  In turn, the Court 
reaffirmed these principles, concluding that because “the police had 
probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the automobile’s trunk 
 
170 Id. at 567. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. (“The officers stopped [this suspect] as he was driving off, searched the knapsack, 
and found 1 ½ pounds of marijuana.”). 
173 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 567. 
174 Id. at 565. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 568-69. 
177 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925). 
178 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158-59). 
179 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
180 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 800). 
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contained marijuana,” the search of the trunk, as well as the brown 
paper bag was lawful.181 
C.  Consensual Vehicular Searches 
Even when exigent circumstances exist and would likely justi-
fy the immediate action taken by the police without procuring a war-
rant, it is wise for officers to at least request permission to conduct a 
search to better the chances of evidence revealed by that search hold-
ing up in court.  Consent to search is an exception, authorizing police 
to make a warrantless search, which is deeply rooted in our history.  
As held in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,182 “when the subject of a 
search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on 
the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quire that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily giv-
en, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.”183 
In Schneckloth, an officer “stopped an automobile when he 
observed that one headlight and its license plate light were burned 
out.”184  The respondent was one among six men in the vehicle.185  Of 
the six men, only one, neither the driver nor the respondent, was able 
to provide the officer with identification.186  After stepping out of the 
car in accordance with the officer’s request, the officer asked for 
permission to search the vehicle and obtained the consent of one oc-
cupant who said, “[s]ure, go ahead.”187  According to the officer’s 
later testimony at trial, there was neither protest nor hostility exhibit-
ed at this time, but rather, one occupant helped the officer in his 
search, as he voluntarily “open[ed] the trunk and glove compart-
ment.”188  Although both the trunk and glove compartment were free 
of any contraband, “[w]added up under the left rear seat [of the vehi-
 
181 Id. at 580; see also People v. Keita, No. 2862-2009, 2011 WL 1936076, at *1, *7-*8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2011) (explaining that probable cause exists “when it is more likely 
than not that a crime took place and that the arrestee is the perpetrator”).  Although not ex-
pressly mentioned in the opinion, it could be argued that the officer in McFarlane who ob-
served the open liquor bottle at least had reasonable suspicion to believe the crime of driving 
while intoxicated has been committed by the defendant.  McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461. 
182 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
183 Id. at 248. 
184 Id. at 220. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220. 
188 Id. 
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cle], the officer discovered “three checks that had previously been 
stolen from a car wash.”189  These checks were seized and presented 
as evidence against the respondent and the search was challenged on 
the ground that the prosecution had not shown that the consenting oc-
cupant had “known that his consent could have been withheld and 
that he could have refused to have [the] vehicle searched.”190 
To determine whether the search was lawfully conducted, the 
Court had to assess whether consent was voluntary.191  In answering 
this question, the Court noted that historically courts have interpreted 
“voluntariness” to accommodate “the complex of values implicated 
in police questioning of a suspect.”192  The Court explained that a de-
termination of voluntariness must be made so as to balance the “need 
for police questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of crim-
inal law”193 against the need to prevent “unfair and even brutal police 
tactics [which] pose[] a real and serious threat to civilized notions of 
justice.194  Thus, relying on the Due Process Clause for guidance, the 
Court noted that the police are neither required to “forgo all question-
ing” nor “given carte blanche to extra what[ever] they can from a 
suspect.”195 
Instead, adhering to the standard used for confessions by 
“Anglo-American courts for two hundred years,” the Court explained 
consent to search, just like a confession, is voluntary if it is “the 
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its mak-
er.”196  Moreover, the Court stated that voluntariness is based on “the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances,” considering the psy-
chological characteristics of the accused and the context in which 
consent was requested.197  Thus, in order to prevent an accused from 
“frustrat[ing] the introduction into evidence of the fruits of [a] search 
by simply failing to testify that he in fact knew he could refuse to 
consent,” the Court concluded that “knowledge of a right to refuse is 
not a prerequisite [to prove] a voluntary consent.”198  Therefore, ab-
 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 222. 
191 Id. at 224-25. 
192 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225. 




197 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. 
198 Id. at 230, 234. 
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sent duress or coercion, the Court found that consent was voluntary 
and the search conducted constitutional.199 
Since Schneckloth, the United States Supreme Court and low-
er federal courts have consistently held that voluntary consent is an 
appropriate justification for a warrantless search.  There are no 
bright-line requirements to establish the voluntariness of the consent 
provided, but rather, as with reasonableness, courts must analyze 
whether consent was voluntarily given on a circumstantial basis.200  
Likewise, in Ohio v. Robinette,201 when “presented with the question 
whether the Fourth Amendment requires that a lawfully seized de-
fendant must be advised that he is ‘free to go’ before his consent to 
search will be recognized as voluntary,” the Court held that no such 
requirement exists.202  In Robinette, the respondent was pulled over 
by a deputy who “clocked [him driving] at 69 miles per hour” along a 
highway with a “posted speed limit [of] 45 miles per hour.”203  After 
“a computer check which indicated that [the respondent] had no pre-
vious violations,” the deputy “issued a verbal warning.”204  The depu-
ty gave the respondent back his license and then inquired whether 
there was illegal contraband in the vehicle.205  The respondent ad-
vised that there was not, and the deputy then requested permission to 
search the vehicle to confirm.206  Although there was nothing to indi-
cate whether and why the deputy had cause to suspect contraband, the 
respondent consented to the search.207  The search revealed both ma-
rijuana and “a pill which was later determined to be 
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA),” and the deputy arrest-
ed the respondent for unlawful possession.208 
The respondent’s initial motion to suppress was unsuccessful, 
but the ruling was reversed on appeal, as the Supreme Court of Ohio 
adopted “a bright-line prerequisite for consensual interrogation,” 
providing in pertinent part that an “attempt at consensual interroga-
tion must be preceded by the phrase ‘At this time you legally are free 
 
199 Id. at 248. 
200 Id. at 248-49. 
201 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
202 Id. at 35. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 35-36. 
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to go’ or by words of similar import.’ ”209 However, rejecting “this 
per se rule,” the United States Supreme Court reversed, reiterating the 
well established rule that “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be 
determined from all the circumstances.”210 
IV.  NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
Like its federal counterpart, the express language in Article I, 
Section 12 of the New York State Constitution guarantees every citi-
zen the right to be secure against unreasonable searches, seizures, and 
other interceptions.211  New York State courts also recognize the vast 
majority of exceptions to the Warrant Clause that are upheld in feder-
al courts.212  For instance, New York State courts likewise observe (i) 
the search incident to arrest exception, (ii) the automobile exception, 
and (iii) consensual vehicular searches as means that authorize war-
rantless searches, as reasonable under the circumstances. 
However, when a search or seizure is challenged in state 
court, New York State courts view the protections afforded under its 
state constitution more generously than federal courts.213  Each 
aforementioned exception is explored below, illustrating its applica-
tion at the state level.  At the outset, it is worth noting that notwith-
standing New York State courts’ liberal treatment of the state search 
and seizure clause, the precedent below shows that the court in 
McFarlane afforded more privacy rights than reasonably necessary 
under the circumstances. 
 
209 Id. (quoting State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995), rev’d by Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33). 
210 Id. at 40 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49). 
211 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
212 See generally People v. Singleteary, 324 N.E.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. 1974) (“The Constitu-
tions, both Federal and State, do not forbid all searches and seizures without a warrant, but 
only unreasonable ones.  There are classical categorical exceptions permitting searches with-
out a warrant.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
213 See, e.g., People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63 (N.Y. 1989) (“[A]lthough the history 
and identical language of the State and Federal constitutional privacy guarantees generally 
support a policy of uniformity, [the Court of Appeals of New York] has demonstrated its 
willingness to adopt more protective standards under the State Constitution when doing so 
best promotes predictability and precision in judicial review of search and seizure cases and 
protection of the individual rights of our citizens.”) (quoting People v. P.J. Video, 501 
N.E.2d 556, 561 (N.Y. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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A.  Searches Incident to Arrest 
In People v. Belton,214 the Court of Appeals of New York, in 
reviewing the improper search and seizure claim before it, first ob-
served that “[t]he identical wording of the two provisions d[id] not 
proscribe [it from] more strictly construing the State Constitution 
than the Supreme Court has construed the Federal Constitution.”215  
Nevertheless, the court found that the search did not violate the state 
constitution and was reasonable under the circumstances.216 
In Belton, “a State trooper stopped [defendant’s] car [which 
was] speeding along the State Thruway.”217  From outside the vehi-
cle, the trooper smelt marihuana and saw “an envelope . . . frequently 
used in sales of that substance” on the floor.218  Based upon these 
plain view observations, the trooper ordered the occupants to step out 
of the car to pat them down.219  The trooper also “inspected the enve-
lope and ascertained that it did contain marihuana.”220  After each oc-
cupant was placed under arrest, the trooper searched the vehicle, in-
cluding the passenger compartment and defendant’s jacket.221  Inside 
of the zippered pocket of the jacket, the trooper found “a small 
amount of cocaine.”222  Defendant claimed that the trooper was not 
authorized to search the vehicle after each occupant was arrested, and 
thus, the seizure was improper.223 
In its analysis, the court observed, the search incident to arrest 
exception was once “limited both temporally and geographically” so 
that a search was permissible only if the search “closely follows ar-
rest and is of the person of the individual arrested and the area within 
his immediate reach.”224  However, “extending Chimel to the facts of 
this case, in which defendant’s jacket was neither on his person nor 
within his reach,” the court noted that federal courts no longer impose 
 
214 432 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1982). 
215 Id. at 745. 
216 Id. at 746. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 





224 Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 747. 
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“any distinct spatial boundary” on this exception.225 
In light of the rationale supporting a broader scope of the 
search incident to arrest exception, the court reasoned the 
“[j]ustification for an automobile search contemporaneous with a val-
id arrest arises . . . not only from the mobility of an automobile, or the 
reduced expectation of privacy as to materials within the automobile, 
or both, but also from the circumstances which validate the arrest.”226  
Therefore, the court explained: 
[A] valid arrest for a crime authorizes a warrantless 
search—for a reasonable time and to a reasonable ex-
tent—of a vehicle and of a closed container visible in 
the passenger compartment of the vehicle which the 
arrested person is driving or in which he is a passenger 
when the circumstances give reason to believe that the 
vehicle or its visible contents may be related to the 
crime for which the arrest is being made (as possibly 
containing contraband or as having been used in the 
commission of the crime) or there is reason to believe 
that a weapon may be discovered or access to means 
of escape thwarted.227 
Applying this principle to the facts in Belton, the trooper was 
justified in stopping the car and ordering occupants out of the vehicle 
to investigate his suspicious plain view observations.228  The court 
found, “the discovery of the marihuana-filled envelope on the car 
floor and the odor of the substance . . . [gave the trooper] reason to 
believe that the automobile might contain other drugs.”229  Thus, the 
trooper was able to “contemporaneously search the passenger com-
partment, including any containers [and defendant’s jacket] found” as 
an incident to the lawful arrest.230 
 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 747-48. 
227 Id. at 748. 
228 Id. (noting however, that “a motorist stopped for a traffic infraction may not be 
searched unless when the vehicle is stopped there are reasonable grounds for believing the 
driver guilty of a crime, as distinct from a traffic offense.”) (citing People v. Marsh, 228 
N.E.2d 783, 785 (N.Y. 1967)). 
229 Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 748. 
230 Compare id. (noting that the officer’s “reason to believe that the car may contain evi-
dence related to crime for which the occupant was arrested” is sufficient to satisfy the search 
incident to arrest exception), with Blasich, 541 N.E.2d at 45 (noting that automobile excep-
tion imposes a heavier burden, requiring probable cause). 
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B.  The Automobile Exception 
In People v. Blasich,231 defendant was convicted for his un-
lawful possession of cocaine, as well as “burglar’s tools and illegal 
weapons, all of which were found in the automobile that he occu-
pied” at the time of arrest.232  On appeal, defendant challenged that 
the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police 
were not authorized to conduct the warrantless search of his car.233  In 
its analysis, the court turned to the automobile exception, observing 
that it was applicable under the circumstances so as to excuse the 
warrant requirement and authorized the warrantless search.234 
In Blasich, an officer “responded to a report of a suspicious 
vehicle in parking lot number two at [Kennedy Airport].”235  Upon 
arriving at the scene, “[t]he officer observed the described vehicle” 
which was occupied by three persons who appeared to be cruising 
along without cause, as “the car passed a number of vacant parking 
spaces and thus did not appear to be attempting to park.”236  The of-
ficer then stopped the vehicle, briefly questioned the driver (defend-
ant), and confirmed that the driver’s license and vehicle’s registration 
were intact.237  In response to the officer’s questions, the driver com-
mented about “buy[ing] gas at a nearby Amoco station.”238  In turn, 
“satisfied that no crime has been committed,” the officer let the vehi-
cle proceed.239 
However, later that evening, the officer learned from a radio 
report that the car stopped earlier that day at Kennedy had failed to 
pay the parking toll required.240  As the officer recalled that defendant 
had mentioned that he planned to buy gas, the officer proceeded to 
the gas station where he spotted defendant inside of his vehicle.241  
The officer went over to the vehicle at which time he observed “on 
the floor of the passenger side of the front seat a number of tools 
 
231 541 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1989). 
232 Id. at 41. 
233 Id. at 41-42. 
234 Id. at 45-46. 
235 Id. at 42. 





241 Blasich, 541 N.E.2d at 42. 
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commonly used to break into cars—a ‘slim jim’, a lock-punching de-
vice, a chisel, and a screwdriver.”242  The officer also saw a gym bag 
on the front seat and two parking lot cards in the back seat.243  The of-
ficer then “seized the tools and the cards.”244  In making this seizure, 
the officer did not immediately arrest the occupants, but “advised 
[them] of their rights and that they were not free to leave.”245  The of-
ficer then “took [the occupants] to the station to investigate fur-
ther.”246 
Upon questioning at the police station, the officer learned that 
defendant had previously misidentified himself.247  In turn, the officer 
arrested defendant for criminal impersonation and “ordered the vehi-
cle impounded.”248  During the vehicle’s search, the police discov-
ered and seized “a .38 caliber revolver[,] an incendiary device and 
cocaine” from the gym bag.249  The only issue before the court on ap-
peal was “whether, under these circumstances, the police were au-
thorized to search the blue gym bag seen on the front seat of the 
car.”250 
The court first considered the scope of a search permitted as 
incident to a lawful arrest, noting that “such a search must be limited 
to the arrestee’s person and the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”251  The court then 
turned to the automobile exception, which tends to authorize a broad-
er search, explaining that “when the occupant of an automobile is ar-
rested, the very circumstances that supply probable cause of the arrest 
may also give the police probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
contains contraband, evidence of a crime, a weapon or some means 
of escape.”252  Under such circumstances, the police are authorized to 
search the vehicle in question, “not as a search incident to arrest, but 










250 Id. at 43. 
251 Blasich, 541 N.E.2d at 43 (citing People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224 (N.Y. 1983)). 
252 Id. 
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rant requirement.”253 
The court further distinguished these two exceptions, recog-
nizing that “in contrast to the search-incident-to-arrest exception, [the 
automobile exception does not] dispense with the requirement that 
there be probable cause to search the vehicle.”254  When there is 
probable cause in these circumstances, the automobile, as well as its 
compartments and locked containers may be searched.255  In addition, 
the court explained, unlike “a search incident to arrest, which is gov-
erned by stricter temporal and spatial limits,”256 the automobile ex-
ception is “applicable whether the search is conducted at the time and 
place where the automobile was stopped or whether, instead, the ve-
hicle is impounded and searched after removal to the police sta-
tion.”257 
Defendant argued, inter alia, that the officer lacked probable 
cause for arrest and the crime underlying the arrest was unrelated to 
the crime uncovered by the search, and thus, the search was unlaw-
ful.258  Rejecting these contentions, the court noted, “[probable] cause 
does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”259  The court found the automobile exception au-
thorized the search of the car and gym bag found therein because un-
der the facts and circumstances the officer had probable cause to ar-
rest defendant.260 
The court agreed however, that “[t]he connection between the 
crime and the search is significant . . . because the nature of the crime 
and the circumstances surrounding the arrest are what provide . . . 
probable cause for the search.”261  Yet, the court stated, “there is no 
inflexible requirement that the search concern only items relating to 
crimes for which the defendant is formally arrested.”262  Therefore, 
 
253 Id. (citing Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 747-48). 
254 Id. (emphasizing that probable cause to search is still required under the automobile 
exception) (citing People v. Langen, 456 N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (N.Y. 1983)). 
255 Id. at 45 (citing Langen, 456 N.E.2d at 1173). 
256 Blasich, 541 N.E.2d at 45 (citing Langen, 456 N.E.2d at 1173). 
257 Id. (citing People v. Orlando, 438 N.E.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. 1982)). 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 44. 
260 Id. 
261 Blasich, 541 N.E.2d at 45. 
262 Id. (citing People v. Ellis, 465 N.E.2d 826, 828-29 (N.Y. 1984)).  In Ellis, the court 
observed that “[t]he basis for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is the re-
duced expectation of privacy associated with automobiles and the inherent mobility of such 
vehicles.”  Ellis, 465 N.E.2d at 828.  The court explained that this diminished expectation of 
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affirming the lower court’s ruling, the court concluded that the officer 
acted within the scope of his authority in the arrest, search, and sei-
zure.263 
C.  Consensual Vehicular Searches 
The search incident to arrest exception and automobile excep-
tion are commonly invoked when a search occurs in the automobile 
context; however, the exception to the Warrant Clause that was at is-
sue in McFarlane was that of a consensual vehicular search.  Alt-
hough the majority in McFarlane found that the scope of the search 
exceeded the authority of defendant’s consent,264 a review of New 
York State decisional law suggests that this conclusion was unwar-
ranted.265  Although the police conduct searches and courts assess 
challenges on a case-by-case basis, when police have cause to believe 
contraband is concealed in a vehicle, both state and federal courts ob-
serve (i) a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile,266 and (ii) 
 
privacy in automobiles “supplies the justification for the search and when it appears that the 
police have probable cause to find contraband of the crime . . . or to find a weapon in the car 
. . . a warrantless search is permissible.”  Id.  (observing that contrary to defendant’s conten-
tion, “it [was] irrelevant that defendant was arrested for a traffic infraction” because the po-
lice nevertheless had probable cause to search the car for a gun). 
263 Blasich, 541 N.E.2d at 45. 
264 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (noting that the court suppressed the evidence seized 
having found the search beyond the scope of the consent provided). 
265 See, e.g., People v. Mosley, 272 N.Y.S.2d 493 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1966); People v. 
Artis, 607 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994); Mitchell, 621 N.Y.S.2d 581; People v. 
Williams, 752 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2002); People v. Leiva, 823 N.Y.S.2d 494 
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2006); People v. Quagliata, 861 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
2008) (observing that in each of these cases where consent was voluntary and the suspect 
failed to place express limitations on the scope of the consent to search, the consensual ve-
hicular search was authorized).  Compare id. (noting that the searches conducted in these 
cases were reasonable under the circumstances, with Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273-74 (empha-
sizing that the court’s holding in this case, requiring specific consent, was limited in its ap-
plication to a search that caused destruction or damage to the vehicle). 
266 See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (“Although vehicles are ‘ef-
fects’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ‘for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.’ ”) (quoting Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 
(1964) (“Common sense dictates . . . that questions involving searches of motorcars or other 
things readily moved cannot be treated identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed 
structure like houses.  For this reason, what may be an unreasonable search of a house may 
be reasonable in the case of a motorcar.”); accord Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 747 (“Among the 
factors that contribute to this decreased expectation are that automobiles operate on public 
streets, they are serviced in public places, their interiors are highly visible; and they are sub-
ject to extensive regulation and inspection.”) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 154, 
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voluntary consent to search,267 as grounds to find the search reasona-
ble under the circumstances.  The search of a locked compartment, as 
in McFarlane, is more intrusive than a sweep of the open areas in a 
vehicle.  Yet, in the absence of express limitations placed on the 
scope of the search, implicitly authorized by general consent to 
search, police should have the authority to search all standard fixtures 
and enclosures in a vehicle. 
In People v. Gomez, the New York Court of Appeals deter-
mined whether “a police officer may conduct a destructive search of 
an automobile based on a suspect’s general consent to search.”268  Af-
ter carefully assessing the exchange between the officer and defend-
ant before defendant consented to the search, and the circumstances 
under which the search was made, the court concluded, “the search [] 
exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent.”269 
In Gomez, the police ran a check on defendant’s vehicle after 
observing windows excessively tinted in violation of Vehicle and 
Traffic Law, section 375(12-a)(b).270  The check did not “turn up any 
negative information,” but the police followed the car for several 
blocks and then pulled defendant over.271  One officer approached de-
fendant to speak with him, while the other officer, “as was his custom 
in car stops, inspected the undercarriage of the car for evidence of a 
hidden compartment.”272  In doing so, the inspecting officer “noticed 
a fresh undercoating around the gas tank.”273  Meanwhile, the officer 
who was speaking with defendant learned that defendant’s registra-
tion card had been tampered with.274  Each of these factors caused the 
police “to suspect that the vehicle may have been used to transport 
 
n.2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
267 Mosley, 272 N.Y.S.2d 493; Artis, 607 N.Y.S.2d 400; People v. Mitchell, 621 N.Y.S.2d 
581 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995); Williams, 752 N.Y.S.2d 709; Leiva, 823 N.Y.S.2d 494; 
Quagliata, 861 N.Y.S.2d 792 (observing that in each of these cases where consent was vol-
untary and the suspect failed to place express limitations on the scope of the consent to 
search, the consensual vehicular search was authorized).  Compare Quagliata, 861 N.Y.S.2d 
at 792 (noting that the searches conducted in these cases were reasonable under the circum-
stances, with Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273-74 (emphasizing that the court’s holding in this 
case, requiring specific consent, was limited in its application to a search that caused destruc-
tion or damage to the vehicle). 





273 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272. 
274 Id. 
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drugs.”275  The officers inquired whether defendant had any contra-
band in the vehicle, “to which defendant responded ‘No.’ ”276  This 
exchange was followed up by the officers’ “request for consent to 
search the car, which defendant gave.”277  Upon receiving consent, 
defendant was directed to exit the vehicle and “sit on the rear bumper 
and wait.”278 
In the back seat of the car, one officer saw “ ‘non-factory’ 
carpet in the location above the area where he earlier spotted fresh 
undercoating.”279  Next, the officer “pulled up the glued carpeting and 
discovered a cut in the floorboard.”280  As each observation raised 
suspicions that contraband was concealed within the vehicle, the of-
ficer then cut open the sheet metal using a pocketknife.281  However, 
the small slit created by the knife made it difficult for the officer to 
“reach what he thought was a plastic bag,” and thus, the officer “re-
trieved a crowbar” from the police car, “which he used to pry open 
part of the gas tank.”282  The officers found “seven bags of cocaine 
weighing approximately 1 ½ pounds from the compartment found in 
the gas tank.”283 
After defendant’s arrest, he challenged that (i) he did not vol-
untarily consent to the search, and alternatively, (ii) if the search were 
voluntary, the drugs seized were inadmissible, as “the search exceed-
ed the scope of the consent.”284  The motion was denied and the sup-
pression court’s ruling affirmed on appeal, as the First Department, 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division found the search within the scope 
of the consent because of “defendant’s failure to place any limitations 
on the search, and his failure to object to the search as it was con-
ducted.”285 
In assessing the Appellate Division’s conclusion, the court re-










283 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272. 
284 Id. at 1272-73. 
285 Id. at 1273 (quoting Gomez, 782 N.Y.S.2d at 744). 
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in Jimeno.286  The court noted the Second Circuit had applied this 
standard, concluding “an individual who consents to a search of his 
car should reasonably expect readily-opened containers discovered 
inside the car will be opened and examined.”287  However, in the in-
stant case, the court recognized that the officer had not merely 
opened containers or looked inside of enclosures, but rather, “dam-
aged the vehicle by removing attached carpeting and physically alter-
ing sheet metal with a crowbar.”288 
Moreover, the court explained, “a general consent to search, 
on its own, does not give an officer unfettered search authority.”289  
Thus, because the search conducted had “impair[ed] the structural in-
tegrity of [the] vehicle” and “result[ed] in the vehicle being returned 
[to defendant] in a matter materially different manner than it was 
found,” the court concluded that this search “clearly crossed the 
line.”290  The court stated that specific consent was required to justify 
the severity of the search and allow the items revealed as a result to 
stand up in court.291 
V.  Conclusion 
The holding in McFarlane illustrates a lack of guidance in the 
area of consensual searches.292  The court primarily relied upon 
Gomez as authority supporting its decision, but it is hardly reasonable 
to compare the overly invasive search tactics used in Gomez with the 
use of a key to unlock a glove compartment, as was the case in 
McFarlane.  The constitutional protection afforded at the state and 
federal level prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.  As shown 
by the caselaw herein, striking a balance between privacy rights and 
law enforcement duties is not a simple task.  Yet, the court in McFar-
lane, in finding a locked glove compartment beyond the scope of 
general consent to search, created a dangerous precedent.  The court 
gave defendant a “get out of jail free card” and future criminal of-
fenders a safe house in which they can carry and conceal contraband 
 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 1273 (quoting United States v. Snow, 44 F.3d 133, 136 (1995)). 
288 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 1273-74. 
292 McFarlane, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 461. 
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without fearing its discovery in the course of a simple traffic stop. 
Absent a suspect properly placing limitations on the scope of 
his or her consent, police should have the authority to search the en-
tire vehicle including enclosures and containers therein so long as the 
search is conducted reasonably.  The police should not be required to 
presume that a suspect intended to, but failed to limit the scope of his 
or her consent, as doing so would inhibit law enforcement.  Likewise, 
allowing criminals to carry and/or use contraband while occupying 
roads and highways endangers the public at large.  Every case varies, 
but the situation in McFarlane is commonplace—a lawful traffic 
stop, plain view observations, police request consent to search, find 
contraband, and the search is challenged in an effort to dispose of the 
criminal charges. 
The officer in McFarlane neither used coercion or force to 
gain consent, nor engaged in intrusive tactics so as to destroy or im-
pair the integrity of the automobile.  Defendant could have, but failed 
to, limit his consent.  Thus, contrary to what the majority concluded, 
the officer’s conduct appeared lawful at is inception and the search 
reasonably executed.  The fact that defendant was wise enough to 
lock his glove compartment, after purposefully using it to conceal a 
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